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Abstract 
 
We test the hypotheses that fundamental characteristics in regional proximity, landlockedness, 
religious-domination, legal origin, and income levels affect cross-country differences in the 
persistence in political terror and political instability in 163 countries for the period 2010 to 
2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. The hypotheses 
are that the following are associated with comparatively higher levels of persistence in 
political terror and political instability: regions with predominantly low income countries 
(Hypothesis 1); landlockedness (Hypothesis 2); Christian-orientation (Hypothesis 3); French 
civil law (Hypothesis 4) and Low income (Hypothesis 5). The tested hypotheses are largely 
invalid. Only Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 2 are robustly investigated in the light of concerns 
about instrument proliferation. Hypothesis 2 is valid for political terror but not for political 
instability while Hypothesis 5 is neither valid for political instability nor for political terror. 
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1. Introduction 
 A June 2015 Global Peace Index (GPI) report maintains that more than 13% of global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is spent on costs related to violent activities (Anderson, 
2015). In the light of the report, in the year 2014, approximately 14.3 trillion United States 
Dollars (USD) (or exactly 13.4% of the world’s GDP) was spent on fighting, inter alia: 
political instability, violence and crimes. To put this point into perspective, the highlighted 
cost is the equivalent to the total annual output of Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain 
and the United Kingdom (UK).  
 It is relevant for policy to be informed about factors that favour the persistence of 
political instability and political terror because according to the GPI (2015), terrorism and 
political instability are estimated to increase in the coming years. Accordingly, terror 
networks have considerably increased in operational scope. This is essentially because terror-
related violence accounted for a significant percentage of killings in 2014, compared to 2008. 
It is also important to note that the diversion of resource that otherwise would have been used 
to address socio-economic needs (in the light of the post-2015 development agenda) are used 
to fight political ‘terror/instability’-related issues. This concern is even worrisome to policy 
makers because political instability and political terror in 2014 resulted in the highest number 
of internally displaced persons recorded since World War II (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2017). The choice of the two political concepts is based on an intuitive conceptual similarity 
and not motivated by prior empirical evidence1. 
 In the light of the above, this study assesses the persistence of political instability and 
political terror. The concept of persistence which is consistent with the attendant literature 
(Asongu, 2018) is understood in relation to the manner in which previous observations of 
political instability and political terror influence future observations of political instability and 
political terror, respectively. “From an empirical perspective, the hypothesis of persistence 
can be investigated with a dynamic estimation approach. Such a dynamic technique is the 
                                                          
1
 Political instability is defined as an “Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 to 100 (very low to very 
high instability) by the EIU’s Country Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicator aggregates five 
other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an 
international tension sub-index. Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided 
for March 2015–March 2016 is the average of the scores given for each Quarter” (GPI, 2016, p. 101). The 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) “measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a 
given year based on a 5-level ‘terror scale’ originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling 
this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US 
Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The average of the two scores is taken” 
(GPI, 2016, p. 102). 
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generalized method of moments (GMM) that has been employed in the recent literature to 
investigate persistence in economic phenomena” (Asongu, 2018, p. 137). In order to provide 
room for more policy implications, the dataset is disaggregated based on income levels, legal 
origins, regional proximity, religious domination and landlockedness. The positioning of this 
inquiry deviates from recent literature which has fundamentally focused on; (i) assessing 
channels by which conflicts, political instability, political terror and crimes can be prevented 
and curbed and (ii) investigating the relationships between violence, political instability and 
macroeconomic indicators. We expand the highlighted strands in chronological order.    
 In the first strand, some recently documented channels through which political terror, 
political instability, crimes and conflicts can be mitigated include: the importance 
transparency (Bell et al., 2014); respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010); the relevance freedom 
of the press and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013); the role of global warming (Price & Elu, 
2016); policy harmonization for the fight against terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018); 
use of military strategies and tactics (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); effective governance tools in 
curtailing crimes and conflicts (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016); the importance of education 
channels (Brockhoff et al., 2015) like enhancement of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008) and 
lifelong learning (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) and the imperative for behavioural analysis 
on the motivations for terrorism (Gardner, 2007).   
 The second strand has focused on examining the relationships between political terror, 
political instability and macroeconomic factors. Studies within this strand include: the 
terrorism-innovation nexus (Koh, 2007); the role of natural resources (Humphreys, 2005); the 
effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment (FDI) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008); the 
terrorism-growth relationship with bidirectional (Shahbaz et al., 2013; Gries et al., 2011;   
Shahzad et al., 2015) and unidirectional flows (Piazza, 2006; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009;  
Öcal & Yildirim, 2010; Meierrieks & Gries,  2013; Choi, 2015) and the relevance of 
development assistance in dampening the negative effect of terrorism on FDI 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings, the intuition and corresponding testable hypotheses. The data and 
methodology are covered in Section 3 whereas Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions.  
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2. Theoretical underpinnings, intuition and testable hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings  
The theoretical background for persistence in political terror and political instability is 
consistent with recent literature on persistence in the banking sector (Stephan & Tsapin, 2008; 
Goddard et al., 2011) and inclusive development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  This 
theoretical background builds on the literature on per capita income catch-up which has been 
considerably documented within the theoretical and empirical growth frameworks (see see  
Barro, 1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  Mankiw et al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986). This 
theoretical underpinning on convergence has recently been extended to other economic 
development fields, notably: financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012; 
Asongu, 2013); inclusive development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014) and policy 
harmonization in the fight against terrorism (Asongu  & Nwachukwu, 2018). It is relevant to 
emphasize that the objective of articulating that the theoretical underpinnings of the 
convergence theory have been used in many economic development areas (financial markets, 
inclusive development,...etc) is to motivate the extension of the theoretical underpinnings of 
the convergence theory to political instability and political terror. Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge such extension is sparse in the literature.   
 Note should be taken of the fact that, in the post-Keynesian époque, nascent economic 
theories were fundamentally motivated by the surge in neoclassical revolution that provided 
enabling conditions for decreasing income variations across countries. Hence, the assumption 
of decreasing variations in wealth across countries was a fundamental basis of economic 
growth theories which advocated free market competition as a facilitator for such 
convergence (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010). Seminal papers which concluded on evidence of 
divergence (i.e. the lack of convergence) substantiated the finding by raising various inherent 
features that inhibit the process of catch-up among nations, notably: differences in initial 
conditions of development and the likelihood of multiple equilibria (Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 
1997). Conversely, there is a contending strand in theoretical literature which argues that 
regardless of disparities in initial development conditions, decreasing variations in income 
levels across countries can be feasible within the framework of countries’ common steady 
state or long run equilibrium (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).   
 Noticeable in the above two conflicting schools in the theoretical literature is that the 
criteria for assessing convergence is not uncommon. Hence, the purpose of this inquiry is not 
to take sides in the debate, but to leverage on the common criteria for examining convergence 
in order to assess persistence in global political stability and political terror.  
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2. 2 Intuition for comparative development and testable hypotheses  
 The intuition underpinning the adoption of features defining the comparative 
development of political instability/terror builds on recent literature on comparative 
development (Asongu & le Roux, 2017;  Beegle et al., 2016; Mlachila et al., 2017; Narayan et 
al., 2011). These features include: regions, landlockedness, religious domination, legal origins 
and income levels. In chronological order, we substantiate the intuition motivating the choice 
of these fundamental characteristics.  
 First, regions with predominantly low income countries should be more associated 
with greater persistence in political terror and political instability because nations that are not 
wealthy have limited financial resources with which to prevent and address the phenomena. 
These arguments have been used to motivate/justify the employment of foreign aid to mitigate 
the negative effects of terrorism in poor countries (Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2017).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Regions that predominantly consist of high income countries experience less 
persistence in political instability/terror compared to their counterparts associated with 
countries with averagely lower levels of income. 
 
  Second, as documented in recent literature (Arvis et al., 2007; Asongu & le Roux, 
2017), there are economic and institutional costs associated with landlockedness. One of such 
institutional cost may be a higher propensity to political instability and political terror. It 
follows that landlockedness may increase persistence in political instability because compared 
to coastal countries; landlocked countries are associated with higher costs in political 
institutions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Landlocked countries are associated with more persistence in political terror 
compared to countries that are opened to the sea.   
 
 Third, with respect to religious domination, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017b) have 
recently documented that Christian-dominated countries are less (more) conservative (liberal) 
when compared with their Islam-oriented counterparts. We argue that a religion that is more 
liberal should be associated with more political instability/terror because liberal qualities like 
freedom of the press and democracy provide enabling conditions for citizens to make their 
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grievances heard. As maintained by Li (2005), such democratic institutions can provide a 
conducive environment for aggrieved citizens to support or “resort to” political terrorism as 
means to conflict resolution. It is important to note that unlike stable autocracies, democracies 
could be associated with more political instability/terror because corresponding institutions do 
little to curtail violence ex-ante. This is consistent with the Christian religion which is more 
favourable to some political liberties. Emphasis is laid on stable autocracies (which is more of 
a characteristic of Islam-dominated countries) because political instability and terror cannot 
be effectively controlled by failing and failed democratic states, compared to their stable 
autocratic counterparts (Lai 2007; Piazza 2008). This narrative is consistence with                                                                                     
Schmid (1992); Eubank and Weinberg (1994); Drakos and Gofas (2006) and Piazza (2007). 
In summary, the nexus between religion and political instability is explained with intuition 
and previous literature. Cited studies are used to argue that: (i) democracies are more likely to 
be associated with political instability and (ii) Christian-dominated countries are 
comparatively more liberal. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Christian-dominated countries are associated with higher levels of persistence 
in political terror/instability, compared to their Islam-oriented counterparts.   
 
 Fourth, some consensus exist in the literature on the relevance of legal origins in 
comparative economic development (La Porta et al.,1998, 1999; Agbor, 2015). In essence, the 
institutional web of formal norms, informal rules and enforcement characteristics that were 
transmitted to colonies by colonial powers are likely to affect political instability and political 
terror in the post-independence era. Two mechanisms have been theorized by Beck et al. 
(2003) to articulate the relevance of the underlying legal origins, notably: political and 
adaptability channels. On the one and, according to the political mechanism, in English 
common law, priority is placed on the rights to private property, unlike the French civil law 
which prioritises the power of the State. On the other hand, the adaptability channel maintains 
that compared to the French civil law, English common law can more easily adapt to 
changing and evolving conditions. It is important to note that both channels are consistent 
with the fact that English common law is more flexible compared to French civil law. For 
example, in the post-colonial era, as of 2014, former French colonies had registered more than 
half of all documented political coup d’états in Africa, notably: 45 versus 22 (Koutonin, 
2014). Such political coup d’états are intuitively and logically associated with political 
terror/instability.    
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Hypothesis 4: English Common Law countries have lower persistence in political 
terror/instability when compared to their French Civil law counterparts.  
 
 Fifth, with respect to income levels, compared to high income countries, we expect 
political instability and political terror to be more persistent in low income countries for the 
fundamental reason that wealthier countries are endowed with more facilities with which to 
prevent and mitigate political instability/terror without incurring substantially negative 
consequences. Some comparative advantages in resources facilities are: infrastructural, 
logistical and financial. These advantages in high income countries are consistent with 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who have argued that aid flows for the fight against political 
terror/instability are from higher income countries to their low income counterparts. 
Furthermore, given the premise that higher income countries are associated with more  quality 
institutions (Asongu,2012), it is reasonable to infer that higher income should be less 
associated with persistence in political terror/instability, since better institutions provide a 
more conducive environment for socio-political stability (Fosu, 2013a, 2013b; Anyanwu & 
Erhijakpor, 2014; Efobi, 2015; Pelizzo  et al., 2016; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016, 2018; Asongu 
& Nnanna, 2019).  
   
Hypothesis 5: Compared to low income countries, high income countries are associated with 
less persistence in political terror/instability.  
   
  It is important to distinguish between Hypothesis 5 (on income levels) and Hypothesis 
1 (on regions) because in regions with predominantly high income countries, not all countries 
are high income countries while in the regions with predominantly low income countries, not 
all countries are low income countries. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We assess a panel of 163 countries with annual data for the period 2010 to 2015. The data are 
obtained from various sources, namely: the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends; Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; a Qualitative assessment by 
the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems (CTS) and the United Nations Committee on Contributions. The adopted periodicity 
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and sample are due to data availability constraints. The periodicity which is motivated by data 
availability constraints and the need to obtain results with more updated policy implications is 
consistent  with recent literature on persistence (Asongu, 2018).  
 Political terror and political instability are used as the two main dependent variables 
whereas the independent variable of interest is the estimated lagged value of the dependent 
variable. Political instability is defined as an “Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 
to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU’s Country Analysis team, based on five 
questions. This indicator aggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, 
opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an international tension sub-index. 
Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for March 
2015–March 2016 is the average of the scores given for each Quarter” (GPI, 2016, p. 101). 
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) “measures levels of political violence and terror that a 
country experiences in a given year based on a 5-level ‘terror scale’ originally developed by 
Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the 
yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US Department of State’s Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices. The average of the two scores is taken” (GPI, 2016, p. 
102). 
Variables in the conditioning information set include: perception of criminality; 
security officers & polices; internal conflicts; import of weapons; violent demonstrations and 
incarcerations.  These indicators have been substantially documented in recent literature on 
the determinants of political terror/instability (Freytag et al., 2011; Blanco & Grier, 2009; 
GPI, 2016). We expect all variables in the conditioning information set to positively affect 
political instability and political terror. Exceptions to these anticipated impacts are the effects 
from incarcerations and “security officers & polices”. 
 Consistent with Section 2, five main fundamental characteristics are adopted, namely:  
(i) income levels (High income, Upper middle income, Lower middle income and Low 
income); (ii) religious domination (Christian with Catholic domination;  Christian with 
Protestant inclination;  Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from 
Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant;  Islam-dominated countries and Buddhist-oriented 
countries); (iii) openness to sea (Landlocked and  Not Landlocked); (iv) legal origins (English 
common law, French Civil law, German civil law,  Scandinavian civil law and Socialists 
countries) and (v) regions (South Asia; Europe & Central Asia; East Asia & the Pacific; 
Middle East & North Africa; sub-Saharan Africa;  Latin America and North America).  In 
what follows, we substantiate the information criteria for the choice of these fundamental 
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characteristics, which have been employed in recent comparative development literature 
(Mlachila et al., 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b)2. 
Whereas categorisation of countries in terms of legal origins is in accordance with La 
Porta et al. (2008, p. 289), the World Bank’s decomposition is used for the classification of 
income groups3.  Landlocked and unlandlocked countries are directly apparent from a world 
map while information on religious-domination is from Asongu (2012). More insights into the 
definition of variables with corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 1 whereas 
Appendix 2 discloses the summary statistics and sampled countries. A correlation matrix is 
also provided in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Specification  
The adopted methodology is in line with studies on the relevance of adapting the estimation 
technique to data behaviour (Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019a, 2019b; Li et al., 2014, 
2016; Zhang et al., 2019). A Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) empirical strategy is 
adopted because it is consistent with recent literature that has examined the persistence of 
economic phenomena (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017). In the accordance with 
the attendant literature, the GMM approach is appropriate for the assessment of persistence 
because it is a dynamic estimation technique which enables the estimation of the lagged 
dependent variable and the estimated lagged dependent variable is used to evaluate 
persistence of the outcome variable. Moreover, five additional insights motivate the choice of 
the estimation approach (Tchamyou et al., 2018, 2019; Assefa & Mollick, 2017;  Amuakwa-
Mensah et al., 2017). The first-two are basic requirements for the employment of the approach 
whereas the last-three are corresponding advantages. First and foremost, the number of 
sampled countries is higher than the corresponding number of periods in each country. Hence, 
the N(163)>T(6) condition is met. Second, both political terror and political instability are 
persistent. This is essentially because the correlations with their first lags are higher than 
0.800 which is the rule of thumb threshold for establishing persistence. The underlying 
correlation coefficients between level and first lag series’ are 0.917 and 0.951 respectively for 
political terror and political instability. Third, since the GMM approach employs panel data, 
cross-country differences are not eliminated in the regressions. Fourth, the estimation 
                                                          
2
 Whereas the motivations underlying the choice of fundamental features have been discussed in Section 2, in the 
section, we articulate the selection criteria for the fundamental features.  
3
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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technique has some bite on endogeneity because it controls for the unobserved heterogeneity 
by means of time-invariant variables. Moreover, the instrumentation process is designed to 
address the simultaneity dimension of endogeneity. Fifth, the system estimator addresses 
inherent biases in the difference estimator.  
 Within the framework of this study, the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of 
Arellano and Bover (1995) is adopted. This is essentially because, when compared with 
traditional GMM techniques (systems and difference GMM approaches), this extension 
reduces the proliferation of instruments (or restricts over-identification) and controls for 
cross-sectional dependence (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016b; Efobi et al., 2018; Tchamyou, 2019, 2020). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiP ,
 
is political instability/terror in country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
W  is the 
vector of control variables (perceptions of criminality; security officers & polices; internal 
conflicts; import of weapons; violent demonstrations and incarcerations),
 
 represents the 
coefficient of auto-regression which is one for the specification, t
 
is the time-specific 
constant,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
  
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 We briefly engage the identification process and exclusion restrictions that are vital for 
a robust GMM specification. We define all explanatory variables as suspected endogenous, 
endogenous explaining or predetermined variables. Only time invariant omitted variables are 
defined as strictly exogenous because as argued by Roodman (2009b), it is not very likely for 
these time-invariant variables to be endogenous after a first difference4.  The strategy of 
identification is in accordance with Tchamyou and Asongu (2017).   
 Given the above identification process, the exclusion restriction framework is used to 
assess if the strictly exogenous variables affect the outcome variables exclusively through the 
suspected endogenous variables. Under this framework, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
                                                          
4
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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for the exogeneity is employed to assess the exclusion restriction assumption. For this 
assumption to be valid, the null hypothesis of the DHT should not be rejected. Failure to 
reject this null hypothesis implies that the strictly exogenous variables influence the political 
instability/terror exclusively through the predetermined or endogenous explaining variables.  
 In the light of the above clarifications, in the findings that are reported in Section 4, 
the assumption of exclusion restriction holds if the DHT that is associated with instrumental 
variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. This process of validating exclusion restrictions 
is not theoretically dissimilar from the standard IV process in which, a rejection of the 
alternative hypothesis corresponding to Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test    
implies that the instruments affect the dependent variables exclusively through the 
endogenous explaining variables (Beck et al., 2003). It is important to note that, only the 
concern of simultaneity or reverse causality in the control variables is tackled with the 
instrumentation process underpinning the identification strategy. Hence, not all concerns of 
endogeneity associated with control variables (e.g. measurement errors) are addressed.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Tables 1-4 present the empirical results. Whereas Tables 1-2 focus on political instability, 
Tables 3-4 are related to political terror. While Table 1 and Table 3 show findings on income 
levels, religious domination and openness to sea (or landlockedness), Table 2 and Table 4 
disclose results on regions and legal origins. Four main information criteria are used for assess 
the validity of the GMM models5. Based on these criteria, the estimated models are valid with 
the exception of the second specification (pertaining to Europe & Central Asia) in Table 4 in 
which the null hypothesis of the second-order autocorrelation test is rejected. It is relevant to 
note that evidence of the validity of models is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
establishment of persistence.  
 In order for persistence to be established, the lagged dependent variable should be: (i) 
significant and (ii) fulfill requirements for convergence. Within the framework of this study, 
the convergence criterion is that the absolute lagged value of the estimated endogenous 
variable should be between the interval of zero and one. We invite the interested reader to find 
                                                          
5
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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more insights into this criterion in recent convergence literature (Fung, 2009, p. 58; Asongu, 
2013, p. 192; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23). 
Results of the full sample are driven by low income countries in Tables 1-2 and lower middle 
income countries in Tables 3-4. 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
Given the above insights, the comparative criterion for greater persistence in political 
instability/terror is as follows: given two sub-samples, the sub-sample with a higher estimated 
lagged value of the dependent variable is considered to reflect more persistence in political 
instability/terror. It is important to articulate the magnitude in the estimated lagged value of 
the outcome variable because it shows how past values of political instability/terror influence 
future values.  Therefore, within a comparative perspective, higher estimated lagged 
coefficients imply that past values influence future values more proportionately.  
The following findings can be established in relation to the tested hypotheses. First, 
Hypothesis 1 is neither valid for political instability nor for political terror. This is essentially 
because regions associated with low income countries do not necessarily reflect higher levels 
of persistence in political instability/terror. Second, Hypothesis 2 is valid for political terror 
but not for political instability. Third, Hypothesis 3 is valid for political instability but not for 
political terror. Fourth, Hypothesis 4 is valid for political instability but not for political terror. 
Fifth, Hypothesis 5 is neither valid for political instability nor for political terror. This  is 
essentially because the persistence in political instability/terror is not an decreasing function 
of income levels. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.   
 
“Insert Tables 2, Table 3 and Table 4 here” 
 
The main comparative emphasise in the reporting of the findings is to assess if the 
testable hypotheses are valid or not. This is essentially because arguments/justifications for 
the validity or invalidity of the stated hypotheses have already been covered in Section 2. 
Hence, trying to discuss the invalidity or validity of each hypothesis in an independent section 
would amount to recycling information already provided in Section 2. However, is it relevant 
to note that when concerns of instrument proliferation are taken on board, only Hypothesis 5 
and Hypothesis 2 are robustly analysed.   
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The invalidity of Hypothesis 5 is a potentially most interesting part of the study 
because it investigates the nexus between political instability and per capita income. The 
invalidity of the investigated hypothesis can be explained by previous research which has 
failed to show a consensus on the nexus between income levels and political instability. This 
attendant literature has documented that the underlying relationship is neither positive, nor 
negative but curvilinear (Boehmer & Daube, 2013; Enders, Hoover & Sandler, 2016; 
Korotayev, A., Vaskin, Stanislav & Ilya, 2018; Korotayev, Bilyuga & Shishkina, 2018; 
Korotayev, Vaskin & Tsirel, 2019). Hence, in the light of previous research, the statistically 
insignificant correlation can be theoretically expected.  
 
 
5. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions  
 
We have tested the hypotheses that fundamental characteristics in regional proximity, 
landlockedness, religious-domination, legal origin, and income levels affect cross-country 
differences in the persistence of political terror and political instability in 163 countries for the 
period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. 
The hypotheses are that the following are associated with comparatively higher levels of 
persistence in political terror and political instability: regions with predominantly low income 
countries (Hypothesis 1); landlockedness (Hypothesis 2); Christian-orientation (Hypothesis 3); 
French civil law (Hypothesis 4) and Low income (Hypothesis 5). The tested hypotheses are 
largely invalid. Only Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 2 are robustly investigated in the light of 
concerns about instrument proliferation. Hypothesis 2 is valid for political terror but not for 
political instability while Hypothesis 5 is neither valid for political instability nor for political 
terror. As a main policy implication, the blanket use of underlying fundamental characteristics 
in comparative development studies focusing on political terror/instability should be treated 
with caution.  
 In the light of the above, there are country-specific factors in the selected fundamental 
characteristics that may be more relevant in accounting for persistence in political terror and 
political instability around the world. This is essentially because the GMM eliminates 
country-specific effects in the modeling approach. Moreover it could also be argued that 
premises upon which the hypotheses are motivated may not be solid. For instance, the law and 
legal origins theory on which Hypothesis 4 is based has a number of shortcomings. 
 A number of doubts have been raised on the legal origins theory, which supposes that  
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British Common law is flexible to a greater extent than Civil law systems. In essence, the 
legal origins theory on which a fundamental comparative feature is based suggests that 
Common law systems (strong property rights, the role of the judiciary, etc.) promote 
economic development better than Civil law systems. Four main criticisms are worth 
articulating. First, some scholars doubt whether the distinction between Civil law and 
Common law can be historically justified (Deakin & Siems 2010; Fowowe, 2014; Asongu, 
2015). Second, owing to growing internationalisation, contemporary trends render the Civil 
law/Common law distinction are less persuasive. Third, it is not apparent why fundamentally 
we may expect differences in Civil law and Common law systems on the pure hypothesis that 
Common law tradition is characterized by juries and judges that are independent (compared to 
weaker dependence on statutes and private litigation and contractual preference as a means of 
addressing social ills), while Civil law tradition  is characterised with less private regulation 
over state regulation, greater reliance on procedural and legal codes and state-employed 
judges. Fourth, classification of nations in terms of Civil law and Common law does not take 
the following into account: the modification and mixture at the moment when foreign law is 
being copied; the influence of pre-transplant law and weight of post-transplant period, during 
which, laws that are transplanted could be altered or differently applied from the country of 
origin. 
Another reason why the hypotheses do not hold is that cross-country differences in 
variables in the conditioning information set may not be consistent with the hypothesis of 
cross-country differences in the fundamental characteristics. This is essentially because 
persistence in political terror/instability is contingent on the variables and empirical 
model/test we choose (Narayan et al., 2011). At times, the variables in the conditioning 
information set may not totally reflect the basis for disaggregating the sample into selected 
fundamental features. Accordingly, from a theoretical standpoint, conditional persistence is 
likely to occur when there are cross-country differences in the determinants of the outcome 
variable. Hence, as a caveat, the conclusions of this study are contingent on the determinants 
of political terror/instability we have employed in the analysis. From intuition and empirical 
validity, the quality/validity of the determinants cannot be called into question. These is 
essentially because, on the one hand, the choices are motivated by intuition and available 
literature and on other hand, the significant estimated values of the determinants have 
expected signs for the most part. The numerical value of determinants can also withstand 
criticism because some recent studies in the literature are based on fewer determinants. For 
instance, Bruno et al. (2012) have used two control variables.  
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It is also worthwhile to emphasize that while certain countries with low income, low 
indexed governance, and low resources become prone to violence or easily fall in the skirts of 
the global imperialist powers (such as the United States of America, France and the United 
Kingdom), other countries that are rich in resources (such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar) are also substantially influenced by the underlying imperialist powers.  
In spite of fact that the tested hypotheses are invalid for the most part, if abstraction is 
made of the comparative emphasis underlying the tested hypotheses, another main policy 
implication pertaining to persistence is that past values of political terror and political 
instability influence future values of political terror and political instability, respectively. 
Moreover, given that the convergence criterion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
the establishment of persistence, it follows that countries with lower levels of political terror 
and political instability are catching-up their counterparts with higher levels of political terror 
and political instability. Such convergence tendency is a further indication that common 
policies in the fight against political instability and political terror are feasible and the 
adoption of such common policies is contingent on the timeline to full catch-up. This 
implication is consistent with the attendant convergence literature on harmonizing cross-
country policies in the fight against negative macroeconomic and institutional signals, in the 
light of a timeline of full convergence (Asongu et al., 2018).  
Further studies can improve the extant literature by assessing if the conclusions in this 
study hold when other fundamental determinants and variables in the conditioning 
information set are employed. Moreover, assessing the timelines for policy harmonization in 
the light of the convergence criteria can improve extant knowledge on the adoption of 
common cross-country policies in the fight against cross-country policy syndromes such as 
political terror.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions and sources of variables  
  
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
£  
Political Terror Political Terror Scale 
Qualitative assessment of Amnesty International and 
US State Department yearly reports 
  
Perceptions of Criminality  Level of perceived criminality in society 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Intensity of internal 
conflict  
Intensity of organised internal conflict 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Weapon imports  Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers 
Database 
  
Violent demonstrations  Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peace Keeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).   
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics and sampled countries  
      
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Political Terror 2.584 1.091 1.000 5.000 978 
£      
Criminality  3.153 0.917 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Intensity of internal conflict  2.412 1.162 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Weapon imports  1.489 0.868 1.000 5.000 978   
      
      
Violent demonstrations  2.912 0.969 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (163) 
 
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
      
Standard dev: Standard deviations. Obsers : Observations.  
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 978) 
         
Criminality S O & P IIC W. Imports V. Dem Incar Pol. Insta. Pol. Terror  
1.000 0.017 0.571 -0.275 0.502 -0.093 0.509 0.567 Criminality 
 1.000 0.063 0.140 -0.093 0.279 0.042 0.004 S O & P 
  1.000 -0.265 0.542 -0.082 0.709 0.684 IIC 
   1.000 -0.256 0.044 -0.238 -0.283 W. Imports 
    1.000 -0.204 0.647 0.518 V. Dem 
     1.000 -0.140 0.006 Incar 
      1.000 0.621 Pol. Insta 
       1.000 Pol. Terror 
         
Criminality : Perceptions of criminality. S O & P : Security Officers & Police. IIC: Intensity of Internal Conflict. W. Imports: 
Weapons Imports. V. Dem: Violent demonstrations. Incar: Incarcerations. Pol. Insta: Political Instability. Pol. Terror: 
Political Terror.  
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Table 1: Persistence in political instability with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Political Instability   
             
 Income Levels (Hypothesis 5) Religious Domination (Hypothesis 3) Openness to sea 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  -0.174 -0.228 -0.144 0.533 0.016 0.381* -2.010 1.241*** 3.325 -0.953 
*** 
0.029 0.126 
 (0.118) (0.308) (0.453) (0.351) (0.942) (0.097) (0.391) (0.000) (0.611) (0.001) (0.914) (0.636) 
Political Instability (-1) 0.494*** 0.632*** 0.596*** 0.605*** 0.957*** 0.804*** 1.393 0.197*** 0.348 0.379**
* 
0.758**
* 
0.619*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.004) (0.186) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Criminality  -0.074 -0.006 -0.061 0.026 0.006 -0.145* 0.285* 0.023 0.585 0.108 0.020 0.001 
 (0.176) (0.921) (0.305) (0.338) (0.875) (0.050) (0.081) (0.787) (0.410) (0.268) (0.726) (0.981) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
0.233*** -0.103** 0.085* -0.012 0.067 -0.034 0.198 0.032 -0.199 0.123 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.069) (0.924) (0.152) (0.475) (0.522) (0.579) (0.667) (0.118) (0.933) (0.947) 
Internal conflicts  0.160*** 0.251** 0.128** 0.037 0.054 0.111 0.165 0.016 -0.002 0.531**
* 
0.074 0.162** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.012) (0.579) (0.191) (0.197) (0.735) (0.850) (0.995) (0.000) (0.285) (0.014) 
Weapons import 0.051** 0.030 0.214* 0.088 -0.018 -0.177** 0.503 -0.011 -0.303 0.288 0.005 0.052 
 (0.011) (0.527) (0.087) (0.704) (0.527) (0.039) (0.105) (0.826) (0.247) (0.100) (0.909) (0.287) 
Violent demonstrations  0.103*** 0.177** 0.174*** 0.103 0.037 0.115* -0.227 0.293*** -0.478 0.112** 0.123** 0.148*** 
 (0.004) (0.036) (0.002) (0.179) (0.538) (0.097) (0.420) (0.001) (0.602) (0.020) (0.033) (0.006) 
Incarcerations   -0.026 0.098 0.006 0.056 -0.122** 0.122 -0.361 0.079 -0.390 -0.019 -0.025 -0.037 
 (0.684) (0.140) (0.863) (0.581) (0.034) (0.202) (0.291) (0.151) (0.517) (0.680) (0.698) (0.556) 
             
AR(1) (0.206) (0.036) (0.035) (0.086) (0.130) (0.262) (0.567) (0.096) (0.680) (0.110) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.819) (0.804) (0.833) (0.729) (0.083) (0.180) (0.846) (0.609) (0.523) (0.217) (0.285) (0.815) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.170) (0.845) (0.159) (0.002) (0.086) (0.186) (0.508) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.257) (0.106) (0.594) (0.454) (0.654) (0.576) (1.000) (0.718) (1.000) (0.770) (0.329) (0.474) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.382) (0.196) (0.209) (0.668) (0.653) (0.252) (0.910) (0.407) (0.992) (0.214) (0.021) (0.153) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.239) (0.146) (0.808) (0.309) (0.538) (0.747) (1.000) (0.779) (1.000) (0.950) (0.936) (0.746) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.252) (0.152) (0.449) (0.578) (0.743) (0.274) (1.000) (0.668) (1.000) (0.881) (0.232) (0.282) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.360) (0.173) (0.753) (0.220) (0.297) (1.000) (1.000) (0.570) (0.978) (0.257) (0.636) (0.894) 
Fisher 919.43*** 2971.68 
*** 
172.04**
* 
172.04**
* 
264.12**
* 
1282.07 
*** 
28.56*** 19.89*** 40.92*** 373.78*
** 
29.76**
* 
27.84*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Little Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Buddhist-dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries.  
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Table 2: Persistence in political instability with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent Variable: Political Instability   
 Regions (Hypothesis 1) Legal origins (Hypothesis 4) Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  omitted 0.065 -0.165 -0.170 0.196 -
1.445*** 
na -0.276 -0.001 0.008 na na 0.126 
  (0.522) (0.805) (0.880) (0.693) (0.003)  (0.219) (0.996) (0.991)   (0.636) 
Political Instability 
(-1) 
-0.020 0.912*** 0.755*** -0.007 0.592*** 0.946***  0.544*** 0.595*** 0.658***   0.619*** 
 (0.960) (0.000) (0.000) (0.967) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Criminality  2.154 0.098*** 0.181* 0.234 0.076** 0.095**  -0.111 0.070 0.039   0.001 
 (0.174) (0.000) (0.064) (0.223) (0.013) (0.043)  (0.183) (0.256) (0.785)   (0.981) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
0.008 -0.034 -0.064 0.205* -0.062 0.011  0.004 -0.060 0.096   -0.004 
 (0.998) (0.165) (0.413) (0.062) (0.562) (0.661)  (0.936) (0.414) (0.224)   (0.947) 
Internal conflicts  omitted 0.093** 0.079 0.169 -0.107 0.003  0.239*** 0.199*** 0.073   0.162** 
  (0.011) (0.516) (0.206) (0.257) (0.954)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.101)   (0.014) 
Weapons import omitted 0.011 0.022 0.073 0.003 -0.128**  0.153*** 0.123** -0.018   0.052 
  (0.683) (0.821) (0.528) (0.920) (0.033)  (0.009) (0.013) (0.808)   (0.287) 
Violent 
demonstrations  
0.121 -
0.070*** 
0.021 0.213** 0.324*** 0.246***  0.388*** 0.117** 0.082*   0.148*** 
 (0.652) (0.007) (0.775) (0.027) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.034) (0.069)   (0.006) 
Incarcerations   -2.157 -0.0004 0.032 0.261 0.070 0.175***  -0.107 0.018 -0.027   -0.037 
 (0.142) (0.979) (0.534) (0.392) (0.251) (0.005)  (0.170) (0.682) (0.854)   (0.556) 
              
AR(1) (0.297) (0.004) (0.166) (0.069) (0.092) (0.159)  (0.011) (0.059) (0.287)   (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.257) (0.424) (0.216) (0.296) (0.491) (0.151)  (0.572) (0.830) (0.360)   (0.815) 
Sargan OIR (0.062) (0.002) (0.010) (0.066) (0.254) (0.118)  (0.000) (0.021) (0.003)   (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.419) (0.989) (0.993) (0.517) (0.899)  (0.182) (0.183) (0.964)   (0.474) 
DHT for 
instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
             
H excluding group (1.000) (0.766) (0.401) (0.301) (0.589) (0.293)  (0.393) (0.547) (0.304)   (0.153) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (0.235) (1.000) (1.000) (0.416) (0.986)  (0.153) (0.112) (0.999)   (0.746) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
(1.000) (0.352) (0.927) (0.939) (0.327) (0.984)  (0.158) (0.173) (0.977)   (0.282) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (0.535) (0.998) (1.000) (0.877) (0.201)  (0.406) (0.356) (0.503)   (0.894) 
Fisher 269.04 
*** 
293.32 
*** 
208.09 
*** 
74.30*** 28.47*** 36.12***  79.98*** 29.44*** 116.86***   27.84*** 
Instruments 31 31 28 31 31 31  31 31 31   31 
Countries  8 48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations  40 240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Eng: 
English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. Social: Socialists 
countries.  ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. NA: 
North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  na: not applicable because of  issues in degrees of freedom.  
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Table 3: Persistence in political terror with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Political Terror  
             
 Income Levels (Hypothesis 5) Religious Domination (Hypothesis 3) Openness to sea 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  0.098 1.002 -0.104 1.143* 0.170 -0.337 0.760 0.348 na -0.011 0.032 -0.030 
 (0.705) (0.168) (0.744) (0.062) (0.583) (0.394) (0.736) (0.291)  (0.963) (0.937) (0.942) 
Political Terror  (-1) 0.650*** 0.544*** 0.420*** 0.593*** 0.294*** 0.607*** 0.446 0.614***  0.549*** 0.432*** 0.432*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Criminality  0.254** 0.084 0.222** 0.036 0.264*** 0.037 -0.008 0.407***  0.038 0.378*** 0.375*** 
 (0.012) (0.208) (0.013) (0.415) (0.004) (0.799) (0.963) (0.000)  (0.666) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
0.124** 0.021 0.085 -0.219** -0.227** 0.059 -0.070 0.132  -0.129 -0.026 -0.033 
 (0.022) (0.790) (0.172) (0.018) (0.015) (0.745) (0.734) (0.109)  (0.217) (0.762) (0.717) 
Internal conflicts  -0.043 0.190** 0.004 -0.218** 0.350*** -0.212* -0.023 -0.203*  0.213** -0.019 -0.075 
 (0.551) (0.019) (0.936) (0.047) (0.000) (0.086) (0.955) (0.091)  (0.015) (0.814) (0.434) 
Weapons import 0.023 0.242*** 0.644*** 0.494 0.178** 0.017 0.251 -0.009  0.132 0.230*** 0.274*** 
 (0.465) (0.001) (0.000) (0.130) (0.018) (0.866) (0.507) (0.857)  (0.456) (0.003) (0.002) 
Violent demonstrations  -0.039 0.048 0.143** 0.114 -0.034 0.446*** 0.146 -0.097  0.222*** 0.002 0.046 
 (0.477) (0.650) (0.043) (0.345) (0.739) (0.004) (0.798) (0.174)  (0.000) (0.969) (0.544) 
Incarcerations   -0.204** -
0.367*** 
-0.176** 0.139* 0.124* 0.092 0.105 -0.009  -0.012 0.017 0.022 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.019) (0.071) (0.096) (0.572) (0.638) (0.858)  (0.885) (0.857) (0.826) 
             
AR(1) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.071) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.303) (0.855) (0.216) (0.581) (0.692) (0.531) (0.336) (0.462)  (0.789) (0.954) (0.988) 
Sargan OIR (0.028) (0.076) (0.577) (0.021) (0.114) (0.075) (0.001) (0.201)  (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.465) (0.844) (0.714) (0.278) (0.422) (0.299) (1.000) (0.713)  (0.364) (0.305) (0.221) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.258) (0.266) (0.458) (0.789) (0.930) (0.121) (0.778) (0.281)  (0.597) (0.123) (0.053) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.600) (0.969) (0.739) (0.124) (0.171) (0.559) (1.000) (0.863)  (0.253) (0.566) (0.615) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.756) (0.724) (0.771) (0.303) (0.327) (0.150) (1.000) (0.586)  (0.572) (0.793) (0.260) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.095) (0.827) (0.356) (0.303) (0.611) (0.892) (0.696) (0.747)  (0.130) (0.025) (0.255) 
Fisher 128.87*** 55.63*** 50.19*** 37.91*** 76.54*** 584.08 
*** 
13.66*** 49.59***  318.43*** 11.96*** 11.59*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31  31 31 31 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49  34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245  170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Little Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Buddhist-dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries.  
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Table 4: Persistence in political terror with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent Political Terror   
 Regions (Hypothesis 1) Legal origins (Hypothesis 4) Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na 0.054 1.218 0.089 0.425 1.918** na 1.469** -0.675 -0.230 na na -0.030 
  (0.884) (0.549) (0.969) (0.241) (0.028)  (0.021) (0.121) (0.885)   (0.942) 
Political Terror  (-1)  0.435*** 0.376* 0.823*** 0.703*** 0.392***  0.495*** 0.373*** 0.652**   0.432*** 
  (0.000) (0.082) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.036)   (0.000) 
Criminality   0.181* 0.346 0.095 0.019 0.027  0.390*** 0.317*** -0.227   0.375*** 
  (0.084) (0.413) (0.759) (0.690) (0.660)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.665)   (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
 -
0.287*** 
-0.192* 0.067 -0.054 -0.143  -0.093 0.004 0.008   -0.033 
  (0.002) (0.076) (0.536) (0.564) (0.108)  (0.174) (0.973) (0.971)   (0.717) 
Internal conflicts   0.088 0.018 -0.157 -0.068 0.368***  -0.309** 0.098 0.145   -0.075 
  (0.220) (0.946) (0.509) (0.493) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.241) (0.622)   (0.434) 
Weapons import  0.183*** -0.178 -0.002 -0.072* 0.031  -0.040 0.405*** 0.279   0.274*** 
  (0.002) (0.445) (0.992) (0.091) (0.839)  (0.588) (0.000) (0.122)   (0.002) 
Violent demonstrations   0.080* -0.002 0.257 0.208** 0.120  0.102 0.097 -0.060   0.046 
  (0.089) (0.986) (0.115) (0.024) (0.460)  (0.375) (0.229) (0.587)   (0.544) 
Incarcerations    0.254*** 0.043 -0.286 0.061 -0.380**  -0.275 0.053 0.380   0.022 
  (0.000) (0.862) (0.581) (0.572) (0.038)  (0.106) (0.488) (0.323)   (0.826) 
              
AR(1)  (0.002) (0.012) (0.018) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.047)   (0.000) 
AR(2)  (0.084) (0.955) (0.686) (0.446) (0.614)  (0.885) (0.834) (0.873)   (0.988) 
Sargan OIR  (0.151) (0.299) (0.066) (0.004) (0.211)  (0.001) (0.071) (0.554)   (0.000) 
Hansen OIR  (0.580) (0.967) (0.871) (0.268) (0.899)  (0.767) (0.380) (0.999)   (0.221) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
             
H excluding group  (0.712) (0.338) (0.075) (0.360) (0.213)  (0.877) (0.433) (0.291)   (0.053) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.417) (0.999) (1.000) (0.264) (0.997)  (0.540) (0.351) (1.000)   (0.615) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
 (0.716) (0.906) (0.970) (0.333) (0.726)  (0.522) (0.362) (0.990)   (0.260) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.228) (0.891) (0.211) (0.235) (0.989)  (0.994) (0.413) (0.988)   (0.255) 
Fisher  53.36*** 394.76*** 27.92*** 45.55*** 202.43 
*** 
 25.14*** 20.07*** 22.46***   11.59*** 
Instruments  31 28 31 31 31  31 31 31   31 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Eng: 
English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. Social: Socialists 
countries.  ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. NA: 
North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  na: not applicable because of  issues in degrees of freedom.  
 
 
